Chapter 1: Understanding Consciousness

What does it feel like to savor a cup of coffee or admire a painting? Have you ever pondered the reasons behind these sensations? Why do our experiences possess such depth and clarity? More specifically, how do the firing of neurons translate into rich experiences when listening to a violin or writing these words? Anil Seth's recent publication offers some intriguing insights. To fully grasp his contributions, it’s essential to first examine the broader landscape of consciousness research.

Consciousness remains an enigmatic subject that, despite its captivating nature, is often regarded as a precarious pursuit, particularly for emerging scholars. Philosopher John Searle recounts a neurobiologist's cautionary advice: “In my field, it’s fine to be curious about consciousness, but secure your tenure first.”

This remark underscores a prevailing doubt regarding our readiness to unravel the intricacies of consciousness. It suggests that obtaining funding for consciousness studies presents a significant challenge.

Why the Hesitation? To comprehend this skepticism, we can refer to David Chalmers’ distinction between the "hard" and "easy" problems of consciousness.

The easy problem involves elucidating how physical systems, like the brain, yield functional and behavioral attributes such as decision-making, sensory processing, attention, and language generation. This is termed the "easy" problem not due to its simplicity, but because it is theoretically answerable. In essence, we have a framework for potentially piecing together answers.

Conversely, the hard problem grapples with a more elusive question: why do physical processes give rise to our rich inner experiences? What accounts for the sensations of drinking wine or attending a concert? It remains unclear how we might approach answering these inquiries and developing testable hypotheses.

Chalmers’ distinction clarified certain aspects but also amplified existing skepticism. Even if one believes the hard problem is theoretically solvable, it doesn’t imply we possess the technological means to tackle it just yet. While research in consciousness was ongoing in the early 2000s, the once palpable enthusiasm seemed to have subsided — perhaps many preferred to secure their tenure first.

How AI Rekindled Interest However, recent advancements in artificial intelligence have rekindled discussions about consciousness: “Can AI be conscious?” “If so, what are the implications?” “What truly is consciousness?”

This renewed urgency has infused the field of consciousness research with a fresh vigor, leading to significant inquiries.

Anil Seth's Being You: A New Science of Consciousness serves as a prime example of this revitalization. As a neuroscientist devoted to consciousness studies throughout his academic career, he couldn't have released this book at a more opportune moment: there is an eager audience ready to engage.

What insights does he offer? While Seth may not provide a definitive solution to the enigma of consciousness, he articulates several compelling claims, establishing a foundation for future exploration. One particularly noteworthy assertion, which I will focus on in this article, is that by addressing what he terms "the real problem of consciousness," the hard problem might be dissolved rather than solved.

Could this be the case?

Reassessing Expectations Before delving into his claims, we must reflect on what type of explanation we seek regarding consciousness and whether our expectations align with reality. Seth offers his perspective:

“I believe consciousness will not be 'solved' like the decoding of the human genome or the acknowledgment of climate change. Its mysteries will not yield to a singular eureka moment—a notion that is often misleading regarding how scientific understanding evolves.” (p. 5)

He continues:

“A science of consciousness should elucidate how various properties of consciousness correlate with the operations of the neuronal structures within our heads. My aim is to show that by accounting for consciousness properties in terms of brain and body mechanisms, the profound metaphysical questions surrounding consciousness will gradually become less perplexing.” (pp. 5-6)

The first step is to reevaluate our expectations. If we anticipate discovering a unique substance that will clarify everything, we are misguided.

Instead, we already possess the necessary components: bodies, neurons, and brains. The challenge lies in understanding how these elements interconnect to produce consciousness.

Seth begins his inquiry not with questions about consciousness but with questions surrounding the brain and body: How does the brain communicate with the body? How does it interact with the external environment? This approach illuminates our surroundings, revealing that what we once considered distant magic might merely be a beautiful flower nearby.

Research Focus Seth points out that traditional perspectives on consciousness often prioritized function and behavior, concluding that consciousness necessitates specific actions or outputs in response to stimuli. He opts for a different route.

Instead, he emphasizes phenomenology—the subjective quality of experiences—the "what it feels like" associated with actions like sipping coffee or perceiving color. This focus on 'subjective experience' acknowledges that even if I describe my sensory perceptions in detail, you do not share my exact experience. You may grasp what it’s like for me to drink coffee, and it may be similar to your experience, but the two are ultimately distinct.

Seth seeks to highlight this unsharable aspect of our experiences instead of concentrating on function or behavior.

The 'Real' Problem of Consciousness Reflecting on the easy and hard problems of consciousness, Seth introduces "the real problem of consciousness."

This real problem focuses on the primary aims of consciousness science: to explain, predict, and control the phenomenological properties of conscious experience. This entails elucidating why a particular conscious experience possesses specific phenomenological attributes based on the brain and body’s physical mechanisms. (p. 22)

While this concept may seem similar to the hard problem, Seth distinguishes it by stating that it does not initially seek to explain how consciousness is embedded in the universe or search for an elusive essence that creates consciousness from mere mechanisms. It diverges from the easy problems as well by concentrating on phenomenology instead of behavior. (p. 23)

Let's consider Seth's perspective and accept his focus on the so-called "real problem." This shift could indeed pave the way for progress, potentially leading to testable hypotheses and gradually bringing us closer to our explanatory goals.

Seth’s Perspective on Consciousness With preliminary concepts established, Seth examines three core properties of consciousness: level, content, and self.

Regarding level, he investigates the range from complete absence of consciousness to full awareness, noting multiple levels in between that could be measured in fascinating ways.

In terms of content, he considers what we are conscious of: smells, thoughts, feelings, and so forth. By focusing on this facet of consciousness, especially in light of recent research on mental states, he posits that we can make substantial progress in understanding consciousness.

For those familiar with contemporary neuroscience, you are likely aware of the trend surrounding "predictive processing." Seth engages with this idea, albeit with a slight variation (details omitted for brevity).

To illustrate predictive processing, consider perception, such as the experience of seeing an apple. Traditionally, one might think that the apple in the external world causes our perception of it. However, this perspective is fundamentally flawed. Engaging with the world involves actively predicting what exists based on sensory information. Incoming sensory signals then adjust our predictions: if they prove inaccurate, we must revise our expectations.

Thus, we receive signals, interpret them, and form predictions about the apple's presence, guiding our interactions. If our experiences contradict our predictions, we adapt accordingly.

The purpose of these predictions is survival, not gaining knowledge about the world or ourselves; their evolutionary origins are rooted in this necessity.

Significantly, the experience of seeing an apple is shaped by the content of the prediction, rather than mere sensory input. What we perceive is influenced by what our brain anticipates, not by the apple itself.

It is crucial to note that these predictions are not conscious; they are part of the process by which our brains present an interpretation of external reality. This process begins with expectations rather than passive reactions.

Although this overview omits several intricate details, predictive processing has generated compelling experimental evidence, encouraging further exploration of the topic.

Why is this Relevant for Consciousness? According to Seth, this predictive mechanism is characteristic of all mental states, not just perception, and is pivotal in unraveling the phenomenological conundrums that have long eluded us. For instance, your brain's predictions explain why there is an experience associated with feeling pain upon hitting your knee or tasting ice cream.

The third property, self, encompasses various forms of self-awareness (body awareness, perspectival self, volitional self, narrative self, social self). He elaborates on these categories concerning the predictive mechanisms discussed earlier, reshaping our understanding of self-illusion. He asserts:

"The experience of being me, or of being you, is itself a perception—a collection of perceptions—a tightly woven bundle of neural predictions designed to keep your body alive." (p. 154)

Dissolving vs. Solving the Hard Problem? This brief overview of Seth’s argument is merely a starting point; for a comprehensive understanding, I recommend reading his book. However, the concepts presented here suffice for evaluating his assertion regarding the potential to dissolve the hard problem.

The argument can be framed as follows:

We perceive a gap between reality and the richness of our experiences, which implies that conscious states originate externally, somehow translating external stimuli into profound inner experiences.

This assumption leads to a dilemma: irrespective of how we depict the physical processes—from the apple to our perception—there remains an elusive quality to experience that the physical narrative cannot account for. This enigma constitutes the hard problem.

However, the crux of the matter is that this initial viewpoint is flawed. Our experience does not begin externally and then manifest internally; rather, it initiates internally with predictions (not entirely disconnected from external stimuli, but not secondary to them). Since phenomenology arises from within, we bypass the challenge of explaining how external factors can yield rich internal qualities.

In essence, it begins and concludes in the mind.

“Dissolving the hard problem diverges from solving it outright or definitively refuting it, but it represents the most promising path for progress, far more effective than either romanticizing consciousness as a mystical phenomenon or dismissing it as a non-issue.” (p. 139)

Final Thoughts What conclusions can we draw from this argument? It certainly offers an intriguing perspective, but it may leave some questions unanswered. I believe Seth's approach does advance our understanding of consciousness, but does it genuinely dissolve the hard problem, or merely shift it?

In terms of dissolution, I am uncertain. It appears he may relocate the same issue rather than eliminate it. While investigating the predictive mechanism instead of the interaction between mechanisms and the external world is indeed beneficial, it merely constitutes methodological progress; the question of why there is something it feels like to see a pigeon persists.

If he is accurate, previous approaches faltered by searching for a mechanism that translates external stimuli into rich experiences. We were, in essence, seeking the wrong mechanism. Instead, we should examine how our brains generate predictions about the world to ensure our survival. While this is a valid point, it raises further questions: why does this prediction carry a conscious quality?

My brain may predict that if I continue moving toward a wall, I will collide with it, resulting in certain undesirable internal responses. Presumably, many organisms can develop similar predictions without being conscious of them.

I appreciate the efficiency of this mechanism. A strong pain sensation upon colliding with a wall would incentivize avoidance, motivating one to evade injury. However, is that sufficient?

I worry that Seth's argument merely relocates the hard problem rather than dissolving it. While this could indeed signify progress, it does not eliminate the inquiry.

We can reframe the question within the context of predictive processing: why does predicting something evoke a particular sensation? Why does my brain's prediction of an apple possess rich sensory attributes, while a worm’s prediction of a tasty object may not?

Returning to our initial inquiry: why does drinking coffee or smelling a rose feel as it does? According to Seth, it is our brains’ continuous predictions that shape these experiences. Predictions manifest in specific ways.

While this certainly isn't the conclusion of our exploration—considerable research remains to be done on why and how these predictions shape our subjective experiences—Seth’s work provides a clearer framework for continued investigation. For this reason, I would argue that Being You: A New Science of Consciousness is a valuable addition to the expanding literature on consciousness and is well worth a read.

The first video, The Meta-Problem of Consciousness with David Chalmers, explores the complexities surrounding consciousness and its implications in the realm of science and philosophy.

The second video, Solving the Hard Problem of Consciousness, discusses various approaches to tackling the hard problem, providing further context to Seth's arguments.